The F-35's New OODA Loop
It is quite interesting that this article brought up COL John Boyd, the father of the OODA loop. It is interesting because COL Boyd was involved in designing the F-15 and F-16, and maneuverability was one of the main issues that he addressed. At a time when decision-makers were saying that missiles will end the era of dogfighting with guns, COL Boyd showed that fighters will still need be have high maneuverability in order to achieve their missions.
The question, then, is whether this still holds true?
Yes, the OODA loop places heavy emphasis on information, because information is crucial for the orientation process of the loop. But the entire process is not sequential; everything is interacting with each other, and a fighter's maneuverability affects the orientation, decision-making, and action processes too.
So while today's fighters may not need to be as maneuverable because maneuverability is being designed into missiles instead, we need to ask the question: can the enemy outmaneuver our missiles? Because if the enemy can do so, it can close the distance to our fighters, and we will still end up in a dogfight. And we will end up in a dogfight against an enemy that is designed for dogfights using a fighter that is not. Who will win?
That same question came up in COL Boyd's mind back in the 60s and 70s, when MiGs came up against F-4s, designed to fight with missiles, in the Vietnam War.
COL Boyd's emphasis on maneuverability is about winning under all circumstances. The execution of the OODA loop must be faster than the enemy's under all circumstances. That was why he came up with the E-M charts to show the performance of various aircraft, to illustrate where their advantages and disadvantages are. That was why he sought to emphasize the design of maneuverability into fighter design.
While information is key to winning battles, maneuverability is an equally important aspect that must not be neglected. As long as human beings are the ones fighting wars, we need to be able to gather information faster than our enemies, orient ourselves faster, decide faster, and be able to act faster.
Under all circumstances.
Should we hedge our bets and emphasize superior information, superior decision-making, and superior maneuverability all at once? Or do we place a gamble that superior information is all we need?
It is quite interesting that this article brought up COL John Boyd, the father of the OODA loop. It is interesting because COL Boyd was involved in designing the F-15 and F-16, and maneuverability was one of the main issues that he addressed. At a time when decision-makers were saying that missiles will end the era of dogfighting with guns, COL Boyd showed that fighters will still need be have high maneuverability in order to achieve their missions.
The question, then, is whether this still holds true?
"If superior performance is not required to win the next war, what is? What characteristics will allow a fifth-generation fighter pilot to execute the OODA loop at a faster tempo than his enemy in a combat scenario he is likely to encounter? The answer, in a word, is information."
Yes, the OODA loop places heavy emphasis on information, because information is crucial for the orientation process of the loop. But the entire process is not sequential; everything is interacting with each other, and a fighter's maneuverability affects the orientation, decision-making, and action processes too.
"While maneuverability allowed a fourth-generation fighter pilot to operate the OODA loop at a faster tempo than his enemy in a dogfight, this is not the primary conflict a fifth-generation fighter is designed around. Today’s designers optimized the F-35 to execute a coordinated OODA loop between a flight of F-35s performing an air-to-air or air-to-ground engagement with today’s weapons and tactics, not a 1970s one-on-one dogfight."
So while today's fighters may not need to be as maneuverable because maneuverability is being designed into missiles instead, we need to ask the question: can the enemy outmaneuver our missiles? Because if the enemy can do so, it can close the distance to our fighters, and we will still end up in a dogfight. And we will end up in a dogfight against an enemy that is designed for dogfights using a fighter that is not. Who will win?
That same question came up in COL Boyd's mind back in the 60s and 70s, when MiGs came up against F-4s, designed to fight with missiles, in the Vietnam War.
COL Boyd's emphasis on maneuverability is about winning under all circumstances. The execution of the OODA loop must be faster than the enemy's under all circumstances. That was why he came up with the E-M charts to show the performance of various aircraft, to illustrate where their advantages and disadvantages are. That was why he sought to emphasize the design of maneuverability into fighter design.
While information is key to winning battles, maneuverability is an equally important aspect that must not be neglected. As long as human beings are the ones fighting wars, we need to be able to gather information faster than our enemies, orient ourselves faster, decide faster, and be able to act faster.
Under all circumstances.
Should we hedge our bets and emphasize superior information, superior decision-making, and superior maneuverability all at once? Or do we place a gamble that superior information is all we need?
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